Enforcing Access Controls on SageMaker Studio Presigned URLs with the aws:sourceIp IAM Condition
A company shares Amazon SageMaker Studio notebooks that are accessible through a VPN. The company must enforce access controls to prevent malicious actors from exploiting presigned URLs to access the notebooks. Which solution will meet these requirements?
Community Votes
57% of anonymous learners picked answer A. Votes are pick records left by other test-takers — they are not the verified answer.
Community Insight
Restricting access with the aws:sourceIp IAM policy condition validates the client IP address on requests, so a presigned URL that is copied and replayed from outside the trusted network is rejected even though the URL itself is still valid.
A company shares SageMaker Studio notebooks reachable through a VPN and must enforce access controls so that malicious actors cannot exploit presigned URLs to reach the notebooks. The question asks which validation mechanism enforces that control at the IAM level.
Choosing the aws:sourceVpc condition, which validates the VPC rather than the client IP address. VPC validation secures the network boundary, but it does not constrain the source address of the request that presents the presigned URL, which is the specific exfiltration risk here.
Community Discussion (4 comments)
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Expert Analysis
Why the Answer Is Correct
The risk is that a presigned URL for a Studio notebook can be captured and replayed from outside the trusted environment, so the control has to bind the request to the expected client source. The aws:sourceIp IAM policy condition restricts the request to a specific client IP address or range, which is exactly the check that stops a presigned URL from being used from an unauthorized location. The scenario states the notebooks are accessed through a VPN, so the legitimate client addresses are known and stable, making IP validation both feasible and effective. The vote was 57 for A, and eesa reasoned that because users arrive through the VPN from known fixed IP ranges, the aws:sourceIp condition is the right restriction, while chris_spencer cited the AWS blog post describing client IP validation with aws:sourceIp as the first of the methods for defending against presigned URL data exfiltration.Why the Other Options Are Wrong
Client VPC validation with aws:sourceVpc (B) verifies which VPC the request originates from rather than the client address, so it secures the network perimeter but does not constrain the source IP that presents a presigned URL, leaving the stated exfiltration path open; ryuhei also argued that IP-based reasoning breaks down with dynamic addresses and proxies, but in this scenario the VPN addresses are fixed. The aws:PrimaryTag condition (C) and the aws:PrincipalTag condition (D) are not client validation mechanisms at all; primary and principal tags evaluate identity-related session context, not network or endpoint provenance, so neither can constrain who presents a presigned URL.Community Comment Notes
The community split 57 for A and 43 for B, and the split is genuinely about the presigned URL threat model. ryuhei, voting B, cautioned that IP restrictions do not control access when users come through dynamic IP addresses or proxies. eesa, voting A, answered that the VPN premise means known fixed ranges, and chris_spencer supplied the authoritative list from the AWS blog, which enumerates client IP validation with aws:sourceIp, client VPC validation with aws:sourceVpc, and client VPC endpoint validation, and identified IP validation as the foundational control for this problem.Official Reference
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