Best Way to Secure Payment Data Stored on a Mobile Device
As a cybersecurity analyst for SecureNet, you are performing a security assessment of a new mobile payment application. One of your primary concerns is the secure storage of customer data on the device. The application stores sensitive information such as credit card details and personal identification numbers (PINs) on the device. Which of the following measures would best ensure the security of this data?
Community Votes
100% of anonymous learners picked answer C. Votes are pick records left by other test-takers — they are not the verified answer.
Community Insight
The question tests mobile platform data-at-rest protection, and the trap is picking controls like biometrics or app updates that protect access rather than the stored data itself.
This EC-Council 312-50v12 question asks which measure best protects credit card details and PINs stored locally by a mobile payment app. Encrypting all sensitive data at rest is the strongest safeguard, since it renders stolen device storage unreadable even if an attacker bypasses app access controls.
Option D (biometric authentication) is the most tempting wrong answer because it sounds security-focused, but biometrics only guard app entry—they do nothing to protect the credit card details and PINs if the device storage is extracted or read offline.
Community Discussion (3 comments)
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Expert Analysis
Why the Answer Is Correct
Option C, encrypting all sensitive data stored on the device, directly addresses the question's stated concern: protecting credit card numbers and PINs at rest. Encryption converts the stored values into ciphertext readable only with the proper key, so even if an attacker roots the phone, dumps the filesystem, or recovers a backup, the payment data remains unintelligible. This is the standard mobile application security requirement (for example, storing PANs encrypted and never in plaintext) and it applies continuously, not just at a single moment. It is therefore the measure that best ensures the security of the stored data.Why the Other Options Are Wrong
Option A, enabling GPS tracking, is a tracking/anti-theft feature, not a data-protection control; it does not prevent anyone from reading the stored card numbers. Option B, regularly updating the app, is good hygiene and may fix known vulnerabilities, but it is reactive and indirect—it does not protect the data already sitting on disk if the device is compromised. Option D, biometric authentication, gates access to the app UI only; an attacker with a forensic image or root access can bypass the login and read unencrypted files, so biometrics alone never secure the stored values themselves.Community Comment Notes
The community consensus aligns with this verdict: qwerty100 and insaniunt both selected C, with insaniunt explaining that "the most effective measure is to encrypt the data" for credit card details and PINs on a mobile device. All 100 recorded votes chose C, though one learner, rorahir, expressed uncertainty about the statement's accuracy while not offering a competing option. Vote totals alone are not proof, but here the unanimous pick matches the mobile security doctrine: protect data at rest with encryption first.Official Reference
Exam Strategy
When a question asks how to protect data stored on a device, look for encryption-at-rest as the answer; access controls like biometrics, PINs, or updates protect entry, not the stored values. Eliminate any option that describes tracking or maintenance rather than data confidentiality.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why is biometric authentication wrong for protecting stored card data?
Biometrics only control app launch; they cannot stop an attacker who reads the device filesystem or a backup directly, so unencrypted card numbers and PINs remain exposed.
Why doesn't regularly updating the app secure the stored data?
Updates patch vulnerabilities reactively but do nothing to protect the plaintext data already sitting on disk if the device is lost, rooted, or forensically imaged.